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REAL PROPERTY: MORTGAGES, LIENS,
AND LANDLORD AND TENANT
by
Frank F Smith, Jr.,*
Susan A. Row,** and
Craig S. Glick***
HIS Survey is an overview of the more significant Texas case law in
the area of mortgages, liens, and landlord and tenant during the pe-
riod October 1985 to October 1986. The Special Sessions of the 69th
Legislature passed no new legislation in these areas.
I. MORTGAGES
A. Tender of Payment
In Fillion v. David Silvers Co. I the court addressed the issue of whether
mortgagors had made a valid tender of sums owed on a mortgage debt in
order to recover title of real property from the mortgagee claiming posses-
sion under a void foreclosure sale. The mortgagors had issued a letter of
credit as tender of payment of all sums due under a note and deed of trust.
The court held that the letter of credit did not constitute a valid tender of
payment. 2
Tender of payment of whatever the mortgagor owes on the mortgage debt
must be accomplished as a condition precedent before title is recoverable
from a mortgagee in possession claiming title under a void foreclosure sale.3
Citing Baucum v. Great American Insurance Co.4 the Fillion court defined
tender as a debtor's or obligor's unconditional offer to pay another a cash
sum on a specified debt or obligation.5 The court found that the letter of
credit did not represent an unconditional offer by the mortgagors to pay the
mortgagee in cash, and therefore was not a valid tender.6
* B.A., J.D., University of Texas; M.A., University of Michigan. Attorney at Law,
Vinson & Elkins.
•* B.A., Baylor University; J.D., Louisiana State University. Attorney at Law, Vinson &
Elkins.
*** B.A., Tulane University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Vinson &
* Elkins.
1. 709 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. Id. at 247.
3. Id. at 246 (citing Willoughby v. Jones, 151 Tex. 435, 251 S.W.2d 508 (1952)).
4. 370 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1963).
5. 709 S.W.2d at 246.
6. Id.
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B. Notice Required for Cure of Default
In Hammond v. All Wheel Drive Co. 7 the borrowers had not made any
payments on the five promissory notes that they had executed. The lender
mailed notice of default to the borrower on March 30, 1983. The notice,
which the borrowers received on April 4, 1983, offered them an opportunity
to cure the default and preclude acceleration of the notes by making pay-
ment of the sums due by April 8, 1983. The borrower failed to cure the
defaults, and the lender accelerated the debt and proceeded with foreclosure.
Following the foreclosure sale the borrower complained that the four days'
notice did not constitute an adequate opportunity to cure the default. Based
on the express waiver contained in each of the five notes, 8 the majority of the
Hammond court held that four days was a reasonable amount of time to
cure a default. 9
Justice Burgess, in a strong dissent, cited Ogden v. Gibraltar Savings Asso-
ciation 10 as authority for the proposition that four days was not a reasonable
amount of time to cure a default.11 Based on the language of the Ogden
court, Justice Burgess argued that four days could not constitute an ade-
quate opportunity to cure, as a matter of law, but instead presented a ques-
tion of fact that precluded summary judgment. 12 The majority distinguished
Ogden on the basis of the existence of the waiver in the case at bar since the
holding in Ogden applied only if no waiver was present.1 3
C. What Constitutes Adequate Bid by Lender at Foreclosure Sale
A recent case decided by the Beaumont court of appeals could have a far-
reaching effect in the foreclosure area. In Lee v. Sabine Bank 14 the mortga-
gee purchased a marine vessel at a marshal's sale.15 After the foreclosure
sale the mortgagee brought suit against the mortgagor for the deficiency es-
tablished at the sale. The court affirmed the lender's deficiency judgment on
factual grounds, but ruled that when a lender purchases collateral securing a
borrower's loan and when a probable significant disparity exists between the
property's sales price and its fair market value, the borrower may present
evidence contesting the sale.16
This probable significant disparity test departs from Texas case law, which
7. 707 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
8. Each note specifically waived "grace, demand, presentment, notice, protest." Id. at
736.
9. Id. at 737-38.
10. 640 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tex. 1982).
11. Hammond, 707 S.W.2d at 739.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 734.
14. 708 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. Even though Lee involved the foreclosure of a marine vessel, the court's dictum ap-
pears to apply the decision to real property as well. For example, the court stated: "A lender
who has secured collateral, whether personalty or realty is under a trust arrangement with the
borrower, in the event of foreclosure, to make an honest effort to reduce the loan as much as
possible by securing a fair price for the collateral." Id at 584.
16. Id. at 585.
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has traditionally followed the "grossly inadequate consideration" test. 17
One court defined the grossly inadequate consideration test as a measure of
"consideration so far short of the real value of the property as to shock a
correct mind, and thereby raise a presumption that fraud attended the
purchase." 18  Mortgagors can satisfy the Lee formulation of the probable
significant disparity between the sales price and market value more easily
than the gross inadequacy test. 19
Lee also departs from Texas case law in that prior to its decision, no Texas
court had found gross inadequacy of consideration alone to be sufficient to
void a foreclosure sale.20 Since the court affirmed the lender's deficiency
judgment, the court's language regarding the amount bid in at the foreclo-
sure sale is technically dictum. The Lee decision, thus, may not greatly af-
fect lenders, but the court's language may signal a trend toward a more
liberal approach to voiding foreclosure sales.
17. See W. BAGGETr, TEXAS FORECLOSURE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.61 (1984).
18. Richardson v. Kent, 47 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932, no writ).
19. Even though Texas case law has generally followed the gross inadequacy test, since
1980 practitioners in Texas have had to be mindful that a nonjudicial foreclosure may be
overturned in a bankruptcy context, even though such foreclosure was consistent with the state
law gross inadequacy test and otherwise not subject to attack under state law. In a highly
controversial decision in 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for the
first time held that a noncollusive, regularly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale could be set
aside as a fraudulent transfer under § 67(d) of the former Bankruptcy Act. Durrett v. Wash-
ington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1980). For a thorough discussion of
Durrett and nonjudicial foreclosure sales as fraudulent transfers generally, see Howard, Fore-
closures-Nonjudicial Style, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS 1983 ADVANCED REAL ESTATE LAW
COURSE BOOK; Comment, Can Mortgage Foreclosure Sales Really Be Fraudulent Conveyances
Under § 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 22 Hous. L. REV. 1221 (1985).
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the trustee or debtor-in-possession may
avoid a transfer made by the debtor or obligations incurred by the debtor within one year
before the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy proceeding if the transfer was made or the obligations
were incurred (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, or (2) for less than a
reasonably equivalent value, and the debtor was insolvent on the date of such transfer or be-
came insolvent as a result of such transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982). The phrase "reasonably
equivalent value" is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code.
The plaintiff debtor-in-possession in Durrett sought to set aside as a fraudulent transfer
under § 67(d) of the former Bankruptcy Act a foreclosure sale conducted nine days before the
debtor filed for bankruptcy. The foreclosing lender bid the full amount of its debt, $115,400,
which was 57.7% of the $200,000 fair market value of the property at the time of the sale. The
Fifth Circuit held that a transfer took place at the time of the foreclosure sale, even though
perfection of the lien occurred prior to the one-year period. 621 F.2d at 203-04. The court
additionally held that the price paid was not a fair equivalent value for the property. The
court based its holding solely on a lack of precedent approving the transfer of real property the
subject of attack under § 67(d) for less than 70% of the market value of the property. Id. at
203. This dictum became known as the Durrett Rule whereby the trustee or debtor-in-posses-
sion could avoid a nonjudicial foreclosure sale under § 548(a)(2) if the property sold for less
than 70% of its fair market value.
20. Gross inadequacy of consideration has been held insufficient to set aside a trustee's
sale. Crow v. Davis, 435 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Only when gross inadequacy of consideration is coupled with some irregularity that caused,
contributed to, or might have caused or contributed to the gross inadequacy, may a sale be
voided. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex. 1975); see W.
BAGGE'rT, supra note 17, § 2.61 n.167.
19871
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D. Default and Foreclosure Based on "Waste"
In Frio Investments, Inc. v. 4M-IRC/Rohde21 4M-IRC/Rohde (4M) sued
to enjoin the foreclosure of land it had purchased from Frio. As part of the
purchase price of the land, 4M gave Frio a note secured by a deed of trust.
Under the note 4M could repay the debt at a discounted value within one
year if 4M was not in default. The land was subject to three superior deeds
of trust. The junior Frio deed of trust expressly permitted 4M to destroy,
remove, or replace improvements on the land, provided that such actions did
not violate convenants in the superior deeds of trust. Furthermore, the Frio
deed of trust provided that a default would exist if the mortgagor defaulted
on any of the prior deeds of trust. The prior deeds of trust contained stan-
dard covenants that required all improvements to remain in good repair and
prohibited waste. After 4M removed improvements from the land, one of
the superior lienholders declared a default and exercised its option to accel-
erate its note. Based on 4M's alleged default under the prior deed of trust,
Frio declared a default under its deed of trust and accelerated its note.
4M tendered payment on the three superior liens. The three superior
lienholders accepted payment and executed releases of liens. 4M also ten-
dered the discounted amount of the note to Frio, but Frio rejected payment
reasoning that because of the default and acceleration of the note, 4M was
not entitled to the discount. 4M filed suit to enjoin foreclosure and asked for
a declaratory judgment holding that it had paid the junior lienholder's note
in full.
In order to permit litigation without interfering with the use of the prop-
erty, the parties agreed that 4M would post a letter of credit for the amount
of the discount. Frio accepted the discounted amount subject to the right to
claim the full amount of the note, and executed a release of its lien. The trial
court declared that Frio's note was paid in full at the discounted amount and
awarded attorney's fees to 4M.
On appeal, 4M argued that it had not defaulted on the prior liens because
the removal of the improvements did not reduce the value of the security
below the amount of the debt, and thus no waste had occurred. The evi-
dence introduced by 4M established that the value of the property after the
improvements were removed greatly exceeded the balance of the total supe-
rior liens. The court held that an allegation of waste does not sufficiently
justify foreclosing a mortgage if the waste alleged did not unreasonably im-
pair the mortgagee's security.22 Since the value of the property exceeded the
debt, 4M's actions did not constitute waste. 4M was, therefore, not in de-
fault under any of the superior liens. Since 4M was not in default under any
of the prior deeds of trust, Frio could not declare a default under its deed of
trust.
Under the holding of Frio Investments, Inc., a mortgagee must determine
21. 705 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. Id. at 786. The court also stated that "[t]he general rule in Texas is that in an action
by a lienholder for waste, damages are not recoverable if the value of the property after the
alleged injury remains sufficient to secure the debt." Id.
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whether the actions constituting waste cause the value of the property to fall
below the amount of the debt before declaring a default. In addition, any
covenants in deeds of trust that entitle foreclosure based on defaults on other
deeds of trust obligate the mortgagee to investigate independently the alleged
defaults under the other deeds of trust. The mortgagee cannot rely on a
statement of default by other lienholders.
E. Foreclosure of Lien on Homestead
In Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, Inc. v. Glover 23 the court held that an
employer who was granted an equitable lien against an undivided half inter-
est in a homestead could not foreclose on the lien.2 4 Glover, while employed
by Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, embezzled money from her employer, a
portion of which was used to pay for improvements to her homestead. In a
civil suit brought by the employer, the employer was granted an equitable
lien on Glover's undivided half interest in her homestead. After Glover
failed to pay the judgment, the employer sought to foreclose the equitable
lien against the homestead. The trial court issued a summary judgment for
Glover, ruling that the equitable lien could not be foreclosed. The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the original trial court lacked jurisdiction over
the subject matter because of article 16 of the Texas Constitution,2 5 which
"protects the homestead against forced sale for the payment of all debts except
for purchase money, taxes and improvements .... -26 The equitable lien
granted by the trial court was, therefore, unenforceable. 27
Another recent decision involving foreclosure of a lien on a homestead
property may have a far-reaching impact on the ability of homeowners' as-
sociations to collect maintenance fees. In Inwood North Homeowners' Asso-
ciation v. Pamilar28 the court held that foreclosure was not a proper remedy
for a homeowner's failure to pay annual maintenance charges. 29 A nonprofit
homeowners' association brought an action against a homeowner to recover
the annual assessment payments and to foreclose on the homeowner's prop-
erty. At the time each homeowner in the Inwood North subdivision
purchased his home, the deeds were subject to any covenants and conditions
on file in the county deed records. One of the recorded instruments provided
that each lot in the subdivision would be subject to an annual maintenance
charge and established a vendor's lien against the residential lots in the sub-
division to secure payment of the charge. The court denied the association's
contention that this declaration created a vendor's lien that attached to and
encumbered the lots.30 According to the court, the assessment charges were
23. 701 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. Id. at 31-32.
25. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 50.
26. Glover, 701 S.W.2d at 25 (quoting Smith v. Green, 243 S.W. 1006, 1007 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1922, no writ) (emphasis by the Glover court)).
27. IA at 28.
28. 707 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




not a part of the purchase price of the property and could not be secured by
a true vendor's lien.31 A vendor could, therefore, not use a default in the
payment of the assessment charges as the basis to foreclose on the
property. 32
In reaching its conclusion the Inwood court distinguished Johnson v. First
Southern Properties, Inc. 33 Johnson had purchased a condominium, received
a percentage ownership in the common elements, and by his deed of trust,
used his percentage ownership to secure the payment of unpaid future as-
sessments. The condominium owner in Johnson actually executed a written
instrument to create a lien on his property, whereas the homeowners in In-
wood took subject to the declaration of record, but did not execute deeds of
trust or other documents expressly agreeing to secure assessments with their
property. The Inwood case involved unsecured obligations to pay assess-
ment charges pursuant to their respective deeds and declarations. The court
ruled that a suit based on the covenant to pay and not foreclosure was the
proper remedy. 34 The court stated that even though it had found no secured
lien or vendor's lien, the homeowners were still obligated to abide by the
covenants and restrictions. 3" The court, therefore, affirmed the judgment for
past-due assessments, which could be enforced by a judgment lien against
the properties subject to any Homestead Act defenses. 36
F Mortgagee's Collection of Insurance Premiums After Foreclosure
In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Jackson Hill Marina, Inc. 37 the court
determined that a mortgagee was entitled to collect insurance proceeds from
the insurance company for a fire casualty even though the casualty occurred
after the mortgagee obtained title to the property.38 Jackson Hill Marina
executed a promissory note and a security agreement in favor of Texas Na-
tional Bank. As part of this transaction Marina purchased a Texas standard
casualty policy from State Insurance Agency, Inc. After Marina defaulted
on the note by failing to make payments, the bank purchased the property at
a private sale of the collateral. After the foreclosure sale a fire destroyed the
property. The insurance company denied the bank's proof of loss claim fol-
lowing the fire loss because of failure to notify them of the change in owner-
ship under the mortgagee clause of the policy. The trial court awarded the
face amount of the policy, interest, and attorneys' fees to the bank.
On appeal the court held that the insurance company was liable to the
bank for the loss caused by the fire because the insurance company had ac-
tual notice of the sale.39 The appellate court held that the insurance com-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 687 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
34. Inwood, 707 S.W.2d at 125-26.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 704 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. Id. at 135-36.
39. Fireman's Fund's agent had sent a memo to the bank stating: "We understand Jack-
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pany was not liable for the face amount of the insurance policy, but rather
for the amount of the deficiency remaining after the foreclosure sale.4° The
court stated that when a mortgagee purchases mortgaged property at a fore-
closure sale, "the mortgagee's interest is limited to the amount of the defi-
ciency remaining on the note after the sale."'4 ' The mortgagee's insurable
interest under an insurance policy containing a loss payable to mortgagee
clause is, therefore, limited to the indebtedness still owed by the mortgagor
after the foreclosure sale.42
G. Void Foreclosure
In Diversified, Inc. v. Walker 43 the court denied damages for lost profits
from the mortgagor or noteholder on the theory of negligence, fraud, or
breach of warranty of title, after setting aside the substitute trustee's deed."
Perma Stone Products Company constructed improvements on property
owned by Walker under a contract for labor and materials. To secure pay-
ment of the contract Perma Stone had Walker execute a deed of trust with
power of sale. When Walker defaulted in the payment of the note, Perma
Stone accelerated the note and posted the property for foreclosure. Perma
Stone orally agreed not to foreclose if Walker paid the delinquent payments
and late charges. Prior to foreclosure Walker tendered payment in cash and
a payroll check. Perma Stone accepted the cash, but refused the check, and
Perma Stone's trustee proceeded with the foreclosure sale, selling the prop-
erty to Diversified. The trial court conditionally cancelled the substitute
trustee's deed on the basis of the oral agreement, provided that Walker pay
the delinquent amount under the note.
On appeal, Diversified argued that the court should order Walker to repay
Diversified for the purchase price Diversified had bid in at the sale, plus
attorney's fees. The court held, however, that the foreclosure sale and
trustee's deed were void as opposed to voidable since the trustee's power to
convey the land never came into being due to unfulfilled conditions and limi-
tations.45 Since the sale was void, the court of appeals held that the trial
court was correct in seeking to restore the parties to the position they would
have held but for the wrongful sale, and that Walker was liable only for the
amount of delinquent payments. 46 The court also denied the claim for attor-
ney's fees.4 7
Diversified filed a counterclaim against the noteholder to recover damages
in the nature of lost profits, relying on the theories of negligence, fraud, and
son Hill Marina, Inc. was sold at auction on 11-17-82. Please return F3793670 to us for




43. 702 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. Id. at 722-24.





breach of warranty of title. The court found no duty imposed by law that
would support an action based on negligence. 48 The court stated that no
authority existed to impose a duty on a noteholder to a purchaser at a fore-
closure sale to conduct the foreclosure sale using ordinary prudence.
49
Diversified also claimed that the notice of substitute trustee's sale and the
substitute trustee's deed contained material misrepresentations constituting
fraud under section 27.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.
50
Although the court found nothing in section 27.01 to preclude its applica-
tion to a trustee's sale of real estate at a foreclosure, Diversified failed to
prove the facts necessary to establish statutory fraud.51 Although this part
of the court's opinion is dictum, the fact that the court considered applying
section 27.01 to a foreclosure proceeding is important. The court in Diversi-
fied concluded that purchasers of land from a substitute trustee's sale have a
duty to inquire whether the trustee has the power to sell.5
2
In Farrell v. Hunt 53 the Texas Supreme Court stated that the measure of
damages for a wrongful foreclosure is the difference between the value of the
property in question at the date of foreclosure and the remaining balance due
on the indebtedness. 54 A majority of the court held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to any damages even though the defendant wrongly foreclosed since
the plaintiff did not introduce evidence as to the amount of indebtedness due
at the time of foreclosure. 55 The plaintiff purchased the property by paying
cash, assuming a note, and giving the defendant a note for the remainder of
the purchase price. The plaintiff introduced evidence as to the amount of the
note owed the defendant, but did not introduce evidence as to the amount
owed at the time of the sale on the note assumed by the plaintiff. The major-
ity held that the plaintiff was required to prove the amount of indebtedness
on both notes, while the dissent argued that the plaintiff should only be re-
quired to prove the amount of indebtedness owed on the note to the defend-
ant.56 The dissent reasoned that the defendant was entitled to foreclose on
the property only to the extent of his deed of trust; the plaintiff should,
therefore, only have to prove the amount of indebtedness owed under the
defendant's note, not under any other indebtedness secured by the
property. 57
The Texas Supreme Court also concluded that the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) 58 did not permit a ground of re-
48. Id. at 722-23. The court cited Bowman v. Oakley, 212 S.W. 549, 552 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ ref'd), noting that the only duty imposed at a foreclosure sale is
on the purchaser to ascertain whether the substitute trustee is empowered to make the sale.
702 S.W.2d at 723.
49. 702 S.W.2d at 723.
50. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1984).
51. 702 S.W.2d at 723.
52. Id.
53. 714 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1986).
54. Id. at 300.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 300-02.
57. Id. at 302.
58. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.826 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1987).
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covery for the plaintiff.59 The court held that the DTPA is intended to
permit a plaintiff to recover actual damages. 6° Actual damages are those
damages recoverable at common law, and since the plaintiff failed to prove
actual damages according to any common law theory, he was not entitled to
damages under the DTPA.61
Interestingly, the Texas Supreme Court did not rule out the application of
the DTPA to wrongful foreclosure suits. Presumably, therefore, if the plain-
tiff had merely proven the total amount of indebtedness owing against the
property, the court might have allowed the plaintiff to recover its common
law damages under the DTPA, measured by the difference between the value
of the property at the date of foreclosure minus the balance of the indebted-
ness, trebled under the triple damages provision of the DTPA. The court,
however, did not discuss the question of whether the plaintiff qualified as a
consumer under the DTPA.
H. Deed Versus Mortgage
In Cherry v. Johnson 62 the Eastland court of appeals refused to construe a
deed as a mortgage because the deed was without underlying indebtedness.63
Johnson owned property constituting his homestead. After experiencing fi-
nancial difficulties and facing foreclosure, he arranged with Cherry and
Texas State Bank of Tatum for a loan. In connection with the loan, he exe-
cuted the following instruments: (1) a warranty deed from Johnson to
Cherry and the bank; (2) an option for Johnson to repurchase the land; and
(3) a lease allowing Johnson to keep possession during the period of his op-
tion to repurchase. The bank and Cherry claimed that Johnson did not
execute a promissory note because Cherry and the bank made no loan;
rather the transaction amounted to a legitimate sale with an option to
purchase. After Johnson failed to pay the lease payments, the bank sent a
demand letter and a notice to vacate the premises. Johnson filed suit alleg-
ing that his warranty deed was actually a mortgage. The jury construed the
apparent sales arrangement to be a mortgage, and the court rendered judg-
ment for usury penalties and attorney's fees.
The court of appeals reversed and held that since Johnson owed no debts
and had no obligation to repurchase, but instead had only an option, the
deed could not be converted into a mortgage. 64 The court stated that it
would not convert a deed absolute into a mortgage unless the deed absolute
apparently secured an indebtedness that the purported mortgagor was obli-
59. Farrell v. Hunt, 714 S.W.2d 298, 299-300 (Tex. 1986).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 300.
62. 703 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, writ granted) [Editor's Note: This case
was reversed by the Texas Supreme Court after this Article went to print. 726 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.
1987).].




gated to pay.65 The facts of the case did not satisfy the requirement because
no note existed, and the only enforceable obligation for Johnson was pay-
ment of the lease rental payments. 66
L Home Mortgages as Collateral
In MP. Crum Co. v. First Southwest Savings & Loan Association67 the
court held that, for purposes of the private sales provision of the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code, home mortgages are not customarily sold in a
recognized market. 68 First Southwest had extended a loan to Crum, secured
by the pledge of nine home mortgages owned by Crum as mortgagee. Crum
defaulted on the loan. Rather than soliciting bids or conducting a public
sale of the collateral, First Southwest bought the nine mortgages at a private
sale and credited Crum with the fair market value of the mortgages at the
time. First Southwest conducted the disposition of this collateral by private
sale pursuant to section 9.504(c) of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code.69
The jury found from a preponderance of the evidence that the collateral
foreclosed upon was not of a type customarily sold in a recognized market
and was not the subject of widely distributed price quotations. This finding
should have precluded First Southwest from purchasing the collateral at a
private sale. In spite of this finding the trial court entered a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and awarded First Southwest a judgment for the
deficiency.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment.70 After review-
ing the evidence adduced at trial, the court ruled that First Southwest was
not entitled to buy the mortgages at a private sale even though they superfi-
cially resembled stocks and bonds, because they were not sold in recognized
markets or included in nationwide standard price quotations.
7
'
65. Id. at 821 (citing Rosinbaum v. Billingsley, 272 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
66. Id. at 821-22.
67. 704 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no writ).
68. Id. at 926-27.
69. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987)
provides:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be
made by way of one or more contracts .... [E]very aspect of the disposition
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially rea-
sonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value
or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification
of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time
after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be
sent by the secured party to the debtor .... The secured party may buy at any
public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized
market or is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price
quotations he may buy at private sale.
70. 704 S.W.2d at 927.
71. Id.
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J. Reasonable Notification Under Section 9.504 of the Uniform
Commercial Code 72
In MBank Dallas N.A. v. Sunbelt Manufacturing, Inc.,73 the Dallas court
of appeals held that written notice of a foreclosure sale of personal property
under section 9.504 is not necessary as long as actual notice is given. 74
MBank made loans to Sunbelt secured by personal property described in
security agreements. After Sunbelt defaulted under the notes, MBank, with-
out sending Sunbelt written notice, foreclosed the liens created by the secur-
ity agreements and purchased the property.
Prior to the sale MBank gave Sunbelt oral notice of the sale. The court
concluded that section 9.504(c) does not require reasonable notification in
writing; rather, whether the notice is oral or written is only one factor that
the court should consider in deciding whether the notice is reasonable. 75
The court stated that the purpose of the section 9.504 notice requirement is
to give the debtor the opportunity to protect his interest in the collateral. 76
Although not required by section 9.504, actual notice, be it oral or written, is
a higher standard and is more reasonably likely to achieve this purpose than
notice merely sent or mailed to a debtor. One point of which practicing
lawyers should be aware is that the notification required by section 9.504 can
be augmented by the security agreement or deed of trust. If the parties agree
by contract upon the notice required before foreclosure, the contractual no-
tice requirements will supplement the provisions of section 9.504 and the
case law interpreting those provisions.
K Standing to Challenge Foreclosure Sale
In Elmore v. McCammon 77 an unsuccessful bidder at a foreclosure sale
brought a proceeding pro se alleging improprieties in the sale and enforce-
ment of federal tax liens.78 Plaintiff had bid twenty-three dollars in silver at
the sale held pursuant to a deed of trust to which he was not a party. He
claimed lawful ownership as a result of the bid and alleged that the substi-
tute trustee's bid in the form of a credit in favor of the mortgagee was
wrongfully entered. The court held that because plaintiff did not have an
interest in the property prior to the sale, he lacked standing to challenge the
validity of the sale.79 The court noted that foreclosure sales in Texas are
governed by statutory notice provisions and contract principles. 80 Consis-
72. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.504 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
73. 710 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. Id. at 635-36. Although this case involves the application of § 9.504 and personal
property, the issues raised are still significant to the practicing real estate attorney.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 636.
77. 640 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
78. The plaintiff alleged that Internal Revenue Service employees exceeded the bounds of
their authority in enforcing the federal tax lien. The court found that the employees were
within the scope and exercise of their authority in connection with the action. Id. at 908-12.
The court found the remainder of the plaintiff's allegations frivolous. Id.




tent with contract principles, Texas case law restricts standing to attack a
foreclosure sale held pursuant to a deed of trust to the mortgagor or parties
having property interests or rights affected by the sale.81
L. Bankruptcy
In Casbeer v. State Federal Savings & Loan Association 82 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed several important issues raised in connection
with a bankruptcy filing by a borrower after a lender posted for foreclosure
several properties owned by the borrower. State Savings held promissory
notes aggregating more than $16,000,000 secured by some of the properties
owned by Casbeer, a Texas real estate developer. After becoming delinquent
in making payments, Casbeer met with State Savings officials in an attempt
to avoid foreclosure on one of the properties. State Savings and Casbeer
reached an agreement in which Casbeer agreed to (1) bring the interest on
the property in question current within thirty days, (2) assign profits from
six additional properties to State Savings, and (3) give deeds of trust to State
Savings on two additional properties. In exchange, State Savings agreed not
to foreclose on the tract in question and agreed to restructure Casbeer's
obligations.
Casbeer subsequently filed for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code, thus invoking the automatic stay against
foreclosure. 83 State Savings filed separate motions to lift the stay imposed
against foreclosure on eight of Casbeer's properties. State Savings also filed
motions seeking a temporary restraining order and temporary and perma-
nent injunctive relief to prevent Casbeer from using the rents as to which
State Savings held deeds of trusts containing rental assignment clauses. The
bankruptcy court authorized State Savings to post the properties for foreclo-
sure and awarded State Savings a replacement lien on funds that Casbeer's
estate received as commission for the sale of one of the properties because
Casbeer had used rents from the properties without court or creditor ap-
proval. Casbeer appealed this ruling, but the district court affirmed on all
issues.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit examined the following three major issues:
(1) False Acknowledgment. The court first addressed the issue of
whether Casbeer, as debtor in possession, could avoid the deed of trust liens
based on the mortgagor's failure to acknowledge the deed of trust properly
before a notary public. Under section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code a
debtor in possession may avoid any transfer of the debtor's property if the
conveyed interest was not perfected when the case began. 84 This provision
81. Id.; see also Mercer v. Bludworth, 715 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1986, writ requested) (only mortgagor or parties in privity with mortgagor may contest valid-
ity of sale under mortgagor's deed of trust).
82. 793 F.2d 1436 (5th Cir. 1986).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1982) provides that a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of
any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982) provides that a debtor in possession upon the commence-
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raised the question of whether the deed of trust liens had been perfected
under Texas law if the deeds of trust were not properly acknowledged before
a notary public. Casbeer had acknowledged one of the profit assignments,
and a State Savings employee notarized the remaining profit assignments
and deeds of trust after Casbeer sent them to State Savings. Thus, except for
the one profit assignment, the documents were notarized without Casbeer's
acknowledgment. If, because of this defect, the deeds of trust were not per-
fected, Casbeer could avoid them in his capacity as a debtor in possession.
The court cited section 13.001 of the Texas Property Code in discussing
whether the liens created by the deeds of trust had been perfected when,
although they had been recorded and had genuine signatures, the signer did
not properly acknowledge these documents before the notary public. 85 Sec-
tion 13.001 provides that a deed of trust is void as to a creditor or subse-
quent purchaser not a party to the instrument if the deed has not been
recorded. 86 Under section 12.001 an instrument conveying real property
cannot be recorded unless the grantor has signed and acknowledged the in-
strument in the presence of two or more credible subscribing witnesses or the
instrument has been acknowledged before and certified by an officer author-
ized to take acknowledgments.8 7
The court held that under Texas law this particular defective notarization
did not prevent recorded deeds of trust from giving constructive notice.88
The court stated that if the officer certifying the acknowledgement is some-
how disqualified and the acknowledgement is not essential to the validity of
the instrument, a subsequent purchaser may not attack the sufficiency of a
record not defective upon its face. 89 Because the acknowledgement was not
a requirement for the validity of these instruments, the court found that the
false notarizations did not prevent the recorded deeds of trust from giving
constructive notice that the debtor in possession could not avoid.90
(2) Cash Collateral and Replacement Lien. The Fifth Circuit next con-
sidered whether the district court had erred in holding that State Savings
had perfected its claim to rents, and if so, whether the court erred in grant-
ing State Savings a replacement lien. The bankruptcy court granted State
Savings a replacement lien because Casbeer had used the rents without court
or creditor approval. In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that
ment of a case assumes the status of a hypothetical lien creditor or a bona fide purchaser of real
property, and may avoid any transfer of the debtor's property if the conveyed interest was not
perfected when the case began.
85. 793 F.2d at 1441.
86. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (Vernon 1984).
87. Id. § 12.001.
88. 793 F.2d at 1440-41.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1441. If a defectively acknowledged instrument is recorded by mistake, it will
not constitute constructive notice to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers if the instrument
shows on its face that it was defectively acknowledged (or if the certificate is otherwise fatally
defective). See Adams, Texas Acknowledgment Law, 47 TEX. B.J. 1347, 1348 (1984) (citing
Gulf Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 139 Tex. 183, 164 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. 1934)).
1987]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the rents were cash collateral, 9' which depended on a finding that the prepe-
tition security interests in the properties extended to rents from the
properties.
The bankruptcy court held that State Savings perfected its interest in rents
by filing post-bankruptcy petition motions, thus entitling State Savings to the
replacement lien for rentals accruing after State Savings perfected its interest
in the rentals. In reaching this holding, the bankruptcy court considered
Taylor v. Brennan,92 which stated that in Texas an assignment of rents in a
pledge to secure a debt is not effective "until the mortgagee obtains posses-
sion of the property, or impounds the rents, or secures the appointment of a
receiver, or takes some other similar action."' 93 The Fifth Circuit interpreted
this holding in In re Village Properties, Ltd. 94 to mean that the form of ac-
tion to perfect an interest in rents is less important than its substantive
thrust, diligent action by the mortgagee demonstrating that he would proba-
bly have obtained the rents had bankruptcy not intervened. 95
The only action taken by State Savings prior to the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition was to post the properties for foreclosure. The Fifth Circuit
stated that posting the properties for foreclosure was not a sufficient action
to perfect an assignment of rents in a pledge to secure a debt. 96 The court
did look, however, at the post-petition conduct by State Savings and deter-
mined that such action perfected State Savings's interest in the rents at that
time. State Savings filed motions to lift the stays and to prevent Casbeer
from using the rents, and filed a complaint for a temporary restraining order
and a temporary and permanent injunction to prevent use of the rents.
The court concluded that State Savings had perfected its interest in the
rents effective on the date that it filed the motion to lift the stay as to the
specific property, and the perfection of the interest related back to a time
prior to bankruptcy for the purposes of section 546(b). 97 The court noted,
however, that perfection did not relate back for the purposes of entitlement
to rent.98 The district court erred, therefore, in concluding that the post-
petition rentals that had accrued before State Savings perfected its interest in
the rentals represented cash collateral. 99 The court, accordingly, instructed
that any rentals accruing before the perfection of the interest in the rentals
91. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1982) defines cash collateral as "cash, negotiable instruments,
documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in
which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest .... " This definition
includes the proceeds, products, offspring rents, or profits of property subject to a security
interest as provided in § 552(b) ... whether existing before or after the commencement of a
case under ... title [11]."
92. 621 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1981).
93. Id. at 594.
94. 723 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1984).
95. Id. at 446.
96. Casbeer, 793 F.2d at 1443.
97. Id. at 1442-43. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1982) limits a trustee's § 544 avoiding powers if
generally applicable law "permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an
entity that acquires rights" in the property before the date of perfection. Id.
98. 793 F.2d at 1443.
99. Id. at 1443-44.
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were to be subtracted from the replacement lien. 10
One interesting aspect of the decision in Casbeer is that in determining
when a security interest in rents is perfected, the Fifth Circuit seemed to
distinguish between an absolute assignment of rents and a collateral assign-
ment of rents. After citing Taylor v. Brennan with approval, the court foot-
noted its discussion by saying that the rental agreements in Casbeer did not
appear to be absolute assignments, and neither party contended that the
rental assignments were absolute assignments. 101 Thus, one must wonder
whether the text of Casbeer relating to the perfection of a security interest in
rents and a lender's entitlement to such rents would apply to an instrument
determined by a court to be an absolute assignment as opposed to a collat-
eral assignment. If so, a lender might be entitled to post-petition rents by
merely demanding that the borrower turn the rents over to the lender as
opposed to taking any of the more active steps required in Taylor v. Brennan.
(3) Usury. The district court had held that the deeds of trust and profit
assignments that Casbeer transferred to State Savings were not usurious
under Texas law. Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision on the usury issue, it did not affirm the district court's analysis of
the usury question. In its analysis the Fifth Circuit concluded that State
Savings had received the consideration, the profit assignments and deeds of
trust, in exchange for not immediately foreclosing on the particular tract of
property. 102 Not foreclosing constituted forebearance; the consideration re-
ceived by State Savings therefore constituted interest.10 3 In determining
whether the interest was usurious, the court stated that interest is not usuri-
ous when a borrower pays undisputed prior obligations as partial considera-
tion for a new loan, except where the lender exacts usurious interest on the
preexisting indebtedness. °04 The court reasoned that a debtor's agreement
to give additional security to cover his obligations to the lender, as part of
the consideration for the lender's agreement not to foreclose on one of the
loans, did not, of itself, render that loan or any of the other loans that the
debtor may have had with the lender usurious.105
The deeds of trust and profit assignments included savings clauses that
prevented State Savings from collecting, charging, or receiving interest in
excess of the legal rate. The court held that the savings clauses in the instru-
ments were enforceable and effective, thus preventing State Savings from col-
lecting, charging, or receiving usurious interest.'0 6 The court added that
Casbeer might have a claim for enforcing the savings clauses, but no facts
existed on which to make that determination. 107
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1442 n.15.
102. Id. at 1445.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1446.
105. Id.




M. Guarantor's Right to Notice of Intent to Accelerate
In United States v. Little Joe Trawlers, Inc. 108 the Fifth Circuit held that
Texas law does not require a guarantor to receive notice of intent to acceler-
ate as a precondition to his liability. 109 The United States guaranteed a
promissory note executed by a borrower to a bank. The borrower executed
an additional note (the second note) to the United States, agreeing to repay
the Government for any sums the United States paid on its guaranty. Sali-
nas guaranteed the second note. After the borrower defaulted on its loan,
the Government paid off the loan in full and accelerated the second note
without giving the guarantors notice of its intention to accelerate and an
opportunity to pay the past due installments.
The guarantors argued that they were entitled to an opportunity to cure
the default, which proper notice would have allowed. The court noted that
Texas law clearly requires that a maker of a note be given notice of intent to
accelerate, "10 but reasoned that just because a guarantor of payment is pri-
marily liable does not mean that he has all the rights and privileges of a
maker. I I ' According to the court, Texas law does not require a guarantor to
receive notice of default or intention to accelerate."1 2 The court added that
if the guarantors wanted notice of the Government's intent to accelerate so
that they could cure the maker's default, the parties should have so provided
in the contract of guaranty." 3 As a matter of good practice, attorneys
should specifically address the issue of notice in contracts of guaranty in-
stead of leaving the issue open to litigation.
N. Proper Venue for Suits Involving Priority of Deed of Trust Liens
The issue before the court in Scarth v. First Bank & Trust Co. '4 was
whether a suit to determine the priority of a deed of trust lien over a home-
stead right fell within the purview of Texas Revised Civil Statutes article
1995. Section 2(a) of article 1995 provides for mandatory venue in the
county in which the real property is located in "[a]ctions for recovery of real
property or an estate or interest in real property, for partition of real prop-
erty, to remove encumbrances from the title to real property, or to quiet title
to real property." 15  The Scarth court held that a suit to determine the
priority of a deed of trust lien did not fall within the confines of section 2(a)
because such a suit did not directly involve title to the land." 6 The Scarth
court relied on the prior holding of the Texas Supreme Court in Bennett v.
108. 176 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1985).
109. Id. at 1254.
110. Id. at 1251.
111. The court clearly stated that a guarantor did not have the same rights and privileges
as a maker. Id. at 1252.
112. Id. at 1254.
113. Id. at 1253.
114. 711 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ).
115. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 2(a) (Vernon 1964) (current version at TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (Vernon 1986)).
116. 711 S.W.2d at 143.
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Langdeau,117 which involved a suit to establish the priority of a deed of trust
lien and the foreclosure of the deed of trust. The Bennett court held that the
mandatory venue requirements of the statutory predecessor to section
2(a) 118 did not apply to such a suit because the primary purpose of the suit,
insofar as it concerned land, was not to establish the title to the land, but to
establish whether the land was subject to the deed of trust and to obtain a
foreclosure of the deed of trust. 11 9 The courts in Bennett and Scarth appar-
ently reasoned that section 2(a) does not apply to actions involving questions
of title in an incidental or secondary manner. The practicing lawyer should
feel comfortable when bringing an action involving the priority of liens or to
foreclose liens in any county allowed by the permissive venue statutes. 120
0. Foreclosures Contrary to Temporary Stay
Goswami v. Metropolitan Savings and Loan Association 121 involved prop-
erty that was part of a bankrupt estate. The bankruptcy court allowed the
debtor to keep the property for a stated period of time as long as certain
conditions were met. If the conditions were not met, the bankruptcy court
would allow the secured creditor to post the property for sale and conduct
the foreclosure sale. The debtor failed to meet the conditions and the se-
cured creditor posted the property for sale. Prior to the foreclosure sale the
debtor petitioned the bankruptcy court for a temporary restraining order to
enjoin the foreclosure. The debtor appealed the bankruptcy court's denial of
his petition. The appellate panel issued an order for a temporary stay that
would last one day beyond the date of the foreclosure sale. One day after the
scheduled foreclosure date, the appellate panel denied the debtor's applica-
tion for stay. Meanwhile, the secured creditor had conducted the foreclo-
sure sale in violation of the appellate panel's order. The court in Goswami
held that the appellate court's subsequent denial of the debtor's motion for a
restraining order invalidated the appellate panel's previous stay and vali-
dated the foreclosure sale that took place during the temporary stay pe-
riod.122 Though successful in this case, foreclosing on property when
restrained from doing so by a court order, in anticipation that the order will
be subsequently dismissed, is not a practice for the faint-hearted. Acting in
contravention of a court order may invite a lawsuit for wrongful foreclosure
and sanctions for contempt.
P. Warranty in Trustee's Deed
In Sandel v. Burney 123 the court considered the issue of whether the war-
ranty of title in a trustee's deed bound the trustee or the beneficiary of the
117. 362 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1962).
118. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(14) (Vernon 1964) preceded § 2(a) (current
version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (Vernon 1986)).
119. 362 S.W.2d at 955.
120. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.031-.040 (Vernon 1986).
121. 713 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
122. Id. at 130.
123. 714 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
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deed of trust. The Sandel court held that the warranty of title bound only
the mortgagor, not the trustee or the mortgagee. 124 The court based its
decision on the fact that Texas is a lien theory state. A deed of trust creates
only a lien and there is no conveyance from the mortgagor to the mortgagee,
thus title never vests in a mortgagee. As a result, a foreclosure sale transfers
legal title from the mortgagor to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. 125
Q. Collection of Attorney's Fees
In Feldman v. Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corp. 126 the court con-
sidered whether two provisions in a deed of trust relating to attorney's fees
were valid and enforceable. In Feldman the noteholder employed an attor-
ney to collect late charges, transfer fees, unpaid interest, and other fees. The
deed of trust stated that the noteholder could collect attorney's fees in the
amount of ten percent of the sum collected if the noteholder gave the note to
an attorney for collection. The deed of trust also stated that the noteholder
could collect reasonable attorney's fees if the noteholder employed an attor-
ney to obtain enforcement of any of the provisions of the deed of trust. The
noteholder collected attorney's fees in the amount of $1,505.50 for the col-
lection of $6,469.61 in delinquent payments from the maker. The maker
contended that these fees were excessive since the deed of trust called for ten
percent in attorney's fees. The court stated that the ten percent attorney's
fees provision was not applicable because the reasonable attorney's fees pro-
vision applied to enforcement while the ten percent provision applied to col-
lection. 127 Presumably, if the noteholder had employed the attorney to
collect the entire note balance as opposed to late charges and other pay-
ments, the ten percent attorney's fees provision would have applied.
II. MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS
A. Lien on Homestead
In Moray Corp. v. Griggs128 a contractor sued a homeowner to recover
sums for improvements to the homeowner's homestead, which the contrac-
tor constructed without a written contract. The contractor also requested
foreclosure of a mechanic's and materialman's lien. The trial court granted
the homeowner's motion for interlocutory summary judgment requesting re-
moval of the lien on the grounds that the contractor could not have a lien
against the homestead without a written contract.
In its appeal the contractor claimed that the lien was valid, asserting that
Texas law does not require an unmarried owner of property to execute a
contract for improvements. The contractor relied on article 16, section 50 of
the Texas Constitution 129 and section 5 3.059 of the Texas Property Code. 130
124. Id. at 41.
125. Id.
126. 704 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
127. Id. at 423.
128. 713 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd).
129. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 provides that the homestead of a family, or of a single
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The court concluded that both provisions require a written contract in order
for a valid homestead lien to exist, even in the case of a single adult per-
son. 131 The written contract must be executed by both the person furnishing
the materials and the owner. 13
2
The contractor also argued that it had a valid mechanic's and material-
man's lien because the homestead provisions of the constitution do not over-
ride article 16, section 37 of the Texas Constitution, which allows for
mechanics' and materialmen's liens without a contract.1 33 Citing Collier v.
Valley Building & Loan Association,134 the court found that a construction
or improvement lien on a homestead is invalid unless created in the manner
prescribed by article 16, section 50 of the Texas Constitution, which requires
the owner to execute a written contract. 135 The court therefore held that the
article 16, section 50 homestead provisions override article 16, section 37,
and require the builder and owner to execute a written contract.' 36
The contractor also sought to remove the materials on the property. The
court refused to allow the contractor to do so because he did not have a valid
lien. Citing Exchange Savings & Loan Association v. Monocrete Pty. Ltd., 13 7
the court stated that Texas law required a valid lien prior to removal of
material used in improvements as a remedy for nonpayment.' 38
B. Lien on Two Lots
In Houston Electrical Distributing Co. v. MBB Enterprises 13 9 the court
held that since two lots, one used for a warehouse and the other for offices,
separated by a city street, were not necessarily connected, the lien of a sup-
plier who delivered materials only to the warehouse lot did not attach to the
other lot. 14° Houston Electric sold and delivered electrical supplies to
Stacey Electrical for use in the construction of a warehouse. A public street
separated the warehouse from the offices across the street. After the claim-
ant delivered materials to the warehouse lot, Stacey sold the lot on which the
office was constructed to MBB. Houston Electrical filed its lien affidavits
and sought to foreclose on MBB's property, contending that the two lots
were contiguous.
Houston Electric argued that a mechanic's and materialman's lien at-
adult person, is protected from forced sale because of nonpayment for improvements unless, in
the case of a single adult, a contract in writing for improvements is executed by the single
adult.
130. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.059 (Vernon 1984) lists the requisites for fixing a lien on
a homestead and specifically states that a written contract must be executed both by the person
furnishing materials and by the owner of the homestead.
131. 713 S.W.2d at 754.
132. Id.
133. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 37.
134. 62 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. 1933).
135. Griggs, 713 S.W.2d at 754.
136. Id.
137. 629 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. 1982).
138. Griggs, 713 S.W.2d at 755.
139. 703 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
140. Id. at 208.
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taches to contiguous lots that are treated by the owner as one unit, and that
the lots were contiguous even though they were subject to the city street
easement. The court rejected this argument and held that the two lots were
not necessarily connected, as required by statute in order to have a lien on
both lots.1 41 The court considered the statute in effect at the time of the
claim 42 and stated that a lien "claimant must prove that the property on
which they want to foreclose a lien is either the improvement itself or such
lot or lots of land necessarily connected with the improvement." 143 Since no
materials were delivered to the lot owned by MBB, the claimant had to show
that the lot was necessarily connected to the warehouse lot, but the claimant
only offered evidence to show that the owner of the two lots treated them as
a unit. The court held that treating the two lots as a unit was insufficient to
attach the lien to both lots.'"
Although Stacey Electrical operated one business entity from both lots,
Stacey used the lots for distinctly different purposes-one for warehouses
and the other for offices. The court distinguished the instant case from prior
cases 1 45 in which courts had held that property treated by the owner as a
unit allowed a lien to attach to the entire unit. In the prior cases the claim-
ants had supplied to the entire unit and the owners had treated the units in
such a way that the materialmen were unable to determine to which particu-
lar lot the claimants had supplied the materials. In the case at bar the claim-
ant had delivered materials to, and they were used on, only one lot, and the
materialman was not confused as to which lot the materials were supplied.
The court stated that evidence that one business entity used two lots is insuf-
ficient to show that a lot to which the claimant supplied no materials is
necessarily connected to a lot to which the materials were supplied and
used.' 46 The court held that Houston Electrical did not have a valid lien on
the lot owned by MBB. 147
The Texas Legislature repealed article 5452 in 1983 and replaced it with
section 53.022(a) of the Texas Property Code, which provides that
mechanic's liens extend to houses, buildings, fixtures, or improvements and
to each lot of land necessarily connected therewith. 148 Because the language
in the two articles is virtually identical, the court's holding in Houston Elec-
trical should remain viable under the new Property Code.
C. Defect in Statutory Warning
The court in Brown v. Dorsett Brothers Concrete Supply, Inc. "49 found that
141. Id.
142. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5452 (Vernon 1973) (repealed 1983).
143. 703 S.W.2d at 207-08.
144. Id. at 208.
145. See Oil Field Salvage Co. v. Simon, 140 Tex. 456, 465-68, 168 S.W.2d 848, 852-54
(1943); Lyon v. Logan, 68 Tex. 521, 524-26, 5 S.W. 72, 74-75 (1887); Bryant-Link Co. v. W.H.
Norris Lumber Co., 61 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933, writ dism'd).
146. 703 S.W.2d at 208.
147. Id.
148. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.022(a) (Vernon 1984).
149. 705 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
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a notice of a materialman's lien claim that did not contain the proper notice
requirement to the owner was defective and that the lien was therefore unen-
forceable. 150 Brown, the property owner, contracted for airport hangar
slabs with a general contractor, who in turn subcontracted with Dorsett.
Dorsett furnished the materials, but never received payment. Subsequently,
Dorsett sent a demand letter and copies of a filed lien affidavit to Brown and
the general contractor.
At trial Brown contended that the notice was defective because it did not
contain the warnings required by article 5453151 for a subcontractor to per-
fect a statutory lien. Under article 5453 the subcontractor must comply with
the applicable notice requirements. One requirement is that the notice to the
owner must contain some "statement to the owner to the effect that if the bill
remains unpaid he may be personally liable and his property subjected to a
lien unless he withholds payments from the contractor for the payment of
the bill or unless the bill is otherwise paid or settled."' 152 The notice sent by
Dorsett did not contain this statutory warning.
The court rejected the contractor's claim that he had complied with the
statute and noted that the statutory warning is a condition precedent to an
enforceable lien. 153 The court held that the notice sent to Brown was defec-
tive and that the lien was unenforceable. 154 When required to comply with
statutory notice requirements, a claimant should, whenever possible, use the
exact language contained in the statute in order to avoid the problem ad-
dressed in Brown.
III. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Oral Modifications to Leases
In Group Hospital Services, Inc. v. One & Two Brookriver Center 155 the
court held that an oral agreement between landlord and tenant regarding
how payment of utilities under a lease would be charged was enforceable and
did not violate the statute of frauds. 156 The landlord filed suit against an
office building tenant, seeking to collect operating cost reimbursements,
charges for additional air conditioning service, and charges for alleged ex-
traordinary use of electricity by the tenant. The lease in question obligated
the tenant to pay, consistent with most commercial office leases, an amount
150. Id. at 766.
151. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Vernon 1958) (current version at TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 53.056 (Vernon 1984)) provides:
(d) To authorize the owner to withhold funds under Subchapter D, the no-
tice to the owner must state that if the bill remains unpaid, the owner may be
personally liable and the owner's property may be subjected to a lien unless:(1) the owner withholds payments from the contractor for payment of the
bill; or
(2) the bill is otherwise paid or settled.
152. 705 S.W.2d at 766.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 704 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ requested).
156. Id. at 889-92.
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representing the tenant's share of the increase in operating costs for the
building above such costs for a specified base year. In addition, the lease
required the tenant to pay fifty dollars per hour for extra air conditioning
requested by the tenant and used during hours other than normal business
hours, and charges for any electrical usage by the tenant deemed extraordi-
nary by the landlord. The extraordinary electricity charges were to be deter-
mined by the use of separate meters.
Prior to the tenant's occupation of the premises, the landlord's electrical
contractor and the tenant had orally agreed, due to the expense of installing
separate meters for each item of the tenant's high electrical consumption
equipment, that the landlord would pay for a single meter and bill the tenant
for all electricity, but then credit the tenant for an amount attributable to
normal electrical consumption. After occupying the premises, the tenant re-
fused to pay the landlord for the additional air conditioning charges. The
tenant claimed that it was being double-billed by being forced to pay the fifty
dollars per hour charge, a charge that included amounts attributable to ex-
traordinary electricity, and the extraordinary electricity charges simultane-
ously. The tenant claimed that the landlord was violating a lease provision
calling for separate metering equipment. In addition, the tenant disputed
the amount of the charges the landlord sought to collect under the operating
cost reimbursement provision. The landlord filed suit to collect all of the
foregoing charges.
The tenant claimed that the oral agreement was unenforceable under the
statute of frauds, but the court disagreed. The court stated that the oral
agreement did not truly modify the lease, but rather filled in the details of
how the lease provisions would be implemented. 157 The court noted that
even viewing the agreement as a modification would not alter its enforceabil-
ity since the modification did not materially affect the underlying obliga-
tion. 158 When the character or value of the underlying agreement is
unaltered, oral modifications are enforceable.1 59
The tenant also counterclaimed against the landlord, asserting that the
landlord violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act provision forbid-
ding a seller of goods or services from "representing that an agreement con-
fers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations, which it does not have or
involve, or which are prohibited by law." 16 The tenant accused the land-
lord of falsely representing that the landlord could (1) bill for both extra air
conditioning and the amount of extraordinary electricity attributable to air
conditioning, (2) orally modify the lease with respect to installing only one
meter instead of a separate meter for each item of the tenant's high electrical
consumption equipment, and (3) bill for extraordinary electricity provided
through a single meter.
157. Id. at 889.
158. Id. at 890. The court stated: "The critical determination is whether the modification
materially effects [sic] the obligations in the underlying agreements." Id. (emphasis in origi-
nal) (citing Homer v. Bourland, 724 F.2d 1142, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984)).
159. Id. (citing Garcia v. Karam, 154 Tex. 240, 244-46, 276 S.W.2d 255, 257 (1955)).
160. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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In affirming the trial court's judgment in favor of the landlord, the court
found that the tenant's claims simply involved a matter of contract interpre-
tation, holding that breach of contract alone does not support a DTPA
claim. 161 Significantly, the court stated that it should guard against eleva-
ting every breach of contract claim to a DTPA claim. 162 The court also
stated that "a case must contain some element of overreaching or victimizing
the unwary in order to create a DTPA claim."' 163 In the instant case the
parties were responsible business people who had been advised by counsel
and thus were outside the DTPA's protection.
B. Distress Warrant Provision Held Constitutional
The case of Lincoln Ten, Ltd. v. White 164 upheld the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure provision relating to the issuance of distress warrants. Rules 610-
620 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide the procedural structure
for obtaining a distress warrant in Texas. 165 These new rules conform to the
due process requirements laid down in Mitchell v. W. T Grant Co. 166 after
prior rules were held unconstitutional in Stevenson v. Cullen Center, Inc. 167
In Lincoln Ten a commercial landlord sought a writ of mandamus to com-
pel the judge to set aside an order dissolving the landlord's distress warrant.
The underlying causes of action were breach of a lease agreement for failure
to pay rent, suit on a guaranty of the lease, and foreclosure of the landlord's
lien. After filing the petition the parties entered into an agreement calling
for the proceeds from the sale of certain real estate owned by the guarantor
to be set aside to pay the rent owed by the tenant. Since the sale never took
place and rent still was not paid, the landlord filed a forcible detainer action
and an application for a distress warrant to preserve its statutory lien on the
tenant's property. The justice of the peace issued the distress warrant.
The tenant argued that the new procedural rules for obtaining a distress
warrant violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment be-
cause they deprived individuals of a property right without a hearing.
Under Mitchell v. W. T Grant Co. 168 states may enact provisions for prejudg-
ment seizures if (1) such writs are issued by judicial officers; (2) the affidavits
and documents in support of such writs set out the facts relied on and are
more than conclusions; (3) the debtor has an immediate right to a hearing;
and (4) dissolution of the writ will be granted absent proof by the applicant
of the facts alleged and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the
writ.169 The court upheld the constitutionality of the Texas rules under the
161. 704 S.W.2d at 888-89.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 889.
164. 706 S.W.2d 125, 128-30 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
165. TEX. R. Cv. P. 610-620.
166. 416 U.S. 600, 607-10 (1974).
167. 525 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). The court
held that the rules afforded insufficient consideration of the due process rights of the tenant.
Id. at 735.
168. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
169. Id. at 607-10.
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four-part test of Mitchell, finding that (1) a court cannot issue a distress
warrant under the rules before final judgment except on written order of a
justice of the peace; (2) the rules require the application for a distress war-
rant to state the grounds for issuance and the specific facts relied upon;
(3) the rules provide the debtor with the right to a judicial hearing no later
than ten days after a motion to dissolve the distress warrant is filed; and
(4) the rules require the warrant to be dissolved at the hearing unless the
specific facts alleged and grounds relied upon for the issuance of the warrant
are proved at the hearing. 170
C. Interpretation of Lease Provisions
Numerous Texas cases decided this past year resolved controversies over
interpretation of various lease provisions. For example, in Exxon Corp. v.
Pollman ' 7 1 the court held that when an original lease provides for an exten-
sion or renewal of the lease at the tenant's election, and the tenant elects to
renew the lease, the time for exercising a purchase option contained in the
same lease is likewise extended. 172 Exxon leased a service station from Witts
for an initial term of fifteen years, which the parties could extend for four
additional five-year terms. The lease provided that Exxon had the right, at
its option, "to purchase the leased premises free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances at any time during the term of this lease."'1 7 3 Witts subse-
quently assigned the lease to Pollman. After extending the term of the lease
under its right to do so under the lease, Exxon gave notification exercising its
purchase option. The landlord refused to convey the property to Exxon,
claiming that Exxon could exercise the purchase option only during the ini-
tial fifteen-year term of the lease.
The court looked to a similar phrase in the lease to construe the purchase
option provision, and found the purchase option provision unambiguous. 174
The lease also contained the phrase "during the term of this lease" in the
section of the lease containing the covenants of quiet enjoyment and defense
of title. Because the two phrases were substantially similar, an interpretation
that the purchase option provision did not survive the initial fifteen-year pe-
riod would also restrict the operation of the covenants of quiet enjoyment
and defense of title to the initial term of the lease. The court found that such
a construction would conflict with common sense. 175 Thus, the court held
as a matter of law that Exxon could exercise the option during the extended
term of the lease. 176
In Alliance Insurance Co. v. First Tape, Inc. 177 the court upheld a mutual
170. Id. at 128-29.
171. 712 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
172. Id. at 233-34.
173. Id. at 231 (emphasis in original).
174. Id. at 233.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 713 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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waiver of subrogation clause in a lease. 178 Alliance issued an insurance pol-
icy to a building owner, who leased the building to First Tape. A fire de-
stroyed the building and Alliance paid the owner $1,000,000. Alliance
subsequently sued the tenant to recover the amount it had paid to the owner,
alleging that the tenant had negligently caused the fire. The lease contained
a contractual limitation of liability in which the insured owner and lessee
mutually agreed to release each other from any claim that could be insured
against. The court found that the parties intended to contract against liabil-
ity, each to the other to the extent of compensation of the loss of insurance
funds. 179 The court held that such agreements are enforceable as long as
they are not contrary to the public interest or public policy.' 80 Based on the
parties' agreement to waive liability against one another, the court refused to
allow Alliance to sue the tenant.'18  Citing a previous decision, 8 2 the court
held that an insurer's rights of subrogation derives from the rights of the
insured and is limited to those rights, and that no subrogation can occur
when the insured has no cause of action against the defendant. 83
D. Duties Owed by Landlords
In Ronk v. Parking Concepts of Texas, Inc. '8 4 the Fort Worth court of
appeals considered the duty owed to a tenant by the owner of an open-air
paid parking lot.' 8 5 In Ronk a female tenant was assaulted while on the
parking lot. The victim of the attack sued the owner, alleging that the oper-
ator of the parking lot had a duty to provide sufficient precautions to protect
her, as a business invitee, against third parties' reasonably anticipated crimi-
nal conduct, by giving an effective warning or hiring servants to provide
protection to her on the lot.' 8 6 The owner filed a motion for summary judg-
ment contending that the law imposed no duty to guard against a third
party's criminal acts unless the owner "knew or had reason to know that
acts that posed an immediate probability of harm to [the tenant] or other
invitees were occurring or about to occur on the premises."' 8 7
The trial court granted the owner's motion for summary judgment, find-
ing that no genuine issues as to any material fact existed. The court of ap-
peals affirmed, finding no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
178. Id. at 720. The lease contained the following mutual waiver subrogation: "Lessor
and Lessee further mutually agree that their respective insurance companies shall have no
right of subrogation against the other party hereto .... Id. at 719.
179. Id. at 720.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Fishel's Fine Furniture v. Rice Food Market, 474 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, writ dism'd).
183. 713 S.W.2d at 720.
184. 711 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
185. The Texas Supreme Court recently decided a similar issue in City of Denton v. Van
Page, 701 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1986). The supreme court concluded that the owner of storage
premises had a duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition for business invitees, or
to warn of any hazard. Id. at 834.
186. 711 S.W.2d at 410.
187. Id. at 410-11.
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operator of the parking lot should have foreseen that the third persons
would commit intentional acts that would likely endanger the safety of a
business invitee. 188 Before reaching this ultimate conclusion, the court con-
ducted an analysis of the applicable law. The court began by citing Genell,
Inc. v. Flynn 189 for the general rule "that the duty of the landowner to an
invitee is to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition so that the invitee will not be injured." 190 The court discussed the
element of forseeability in such circumstances and cited the Texas Supreme
Court case of Nixon v. Mister Property Management 191 for the proposition
that a third party's criminal conduct is a superseding cause that relieves a
negligent actor of liability unless the criminal conduct is a foreseeable result
of such negligence.' 92 The court then discussed forseeability and further an-
alyzed the Nixon case and other parallel secondary authorities, finally con-
cluding that:
Based upon our review of all the aforementioned authorities, it appears
by analogy and we hold that the operator of an open-air parking lot
owes a duty to protect his business invitees from intentional injuries
caused by third parties if the operator has reason to believe from what
he has observed or from past experience that such acts are occurring, or
that there is a likelihood that such acts are about to occur, on the part
of third persons which is likely to endanger the safety of the business
invitee. 193
The court then considered the summary judgment evidence to determine if a
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the operator should
have reasonably anticipated the criminal conduct on the part of the third
person. The court concluded that the tenant did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact and was not entitled to prevent the owner's summary
judgment.194
Another issue of the liability of an owner-lessor arose in O'Neill v. Startex
Petroleum, Inc. 195 Oliver, the president and sole stockholder of Startex,
owned a gasoline station and convenience store and leased them to Startex.
Startex subsequently subleased the premises to Theodore LaTouf to operate
188. Id. at 419.
189. 163 Tex. 632, 358 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1962).
190. Id. at 636-37, 358 S.W.2d at 546.
191. 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985).
192. Id. at 550. The court, in its analysis, acknowledged the recent case of Allright, Inc. v.
Pearson, 711 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], writ requested), in which an assail-
ant robbed a monthly tenant of a multi-story parking garage at gunpoint and stole the tenant's
automobile while the tenant was inside the parking structure. The Allright court found that
the parking garage had a duty to provide security or to warn of lack of security to its custom-
ers, and had failed to provide the adequate security or a safe and secure place to park, or to
warn that no attendant was available after certain hours. Id. at 692. The court held that the
parking garage was negligent and liable for damages. Id. at 697. The court in Ronk distin-
guished Allright on the basis of expert testimony given during the Allright trial that led to the
conclusion that a reasonably foreseeable possibility existed that a person bent on robbery could
enter, hide on upper levels, and lie in wait for persons coming in, regardless of whether such
incidents had occurred in the past. 711 S.W.2d at 418-19.
193. Ronk, 711 S.W.2d at 414 (footnote omitted).
194. Id. at 419.
195. 715 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ requested).
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a service station on behalf of Startex. O'Neill, an employee of the sublessee,
was injured during an armed robbery of the station and brought an action
based on negligence, since the lessee and sublessee did not carry worker's
compensation insurance. The court reversed the trial court's granting of
summary judgment in favor of Startex and Oliver. 196 The court determined
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the relationship
between the landowner oil company and service station operator was one of
landlord and tenant or master and servant. 197 This fact question was impor-
tant because a landlord usually does not owe a duty to a tenant's employee,
but a master owes a duty of ordinary care to his servant. 198 The extent of
control over the details of the work to be performed in the operation of the
service station by the owner defines the relationship between the owner and
operator as either landlord-tenant or master-servant. 199 Many cases look at
the actual control exercised by the property owner, as well as the right of
control over the premises in the operation of the business under the con-
tract.2°° In Startex the court examined the relationship between the owner
and the sublessee and concluded that the employee raised issues of material
fact regarding the owner's right to control the operation of the service sta-
tion so as to establish a master-servant relationship and the duties such a
relationship entails.20 1
E. Liability of Corporate Tenants
In River Oaks Shopping Center v. Pagan 202 Pagan Corporation, as tenant,
entered into a lease agreement with River Oaks Shopping Center. Pagan
assigned the lease and agreed to remain primarily liable for its obligations
under the lease. After the assignment, Pagan Corporation forfeited its char-
ter and corporate privileges. After the assignee defaulted on the lease, the
lessor sued the corporate officers of the defunct Pagan Corporation individu-
ally for breach of the lease. 20 3 Justice Sears, writing for the court, consid-
ered the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Schwab v. Schlumberger Well
Surveying Corp. 204 and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the cor-
196. Id. at 806.
197. Id. The court examined the case law governing this issue when service station opera-
tions are involved and remanded the case. Id. at 804-06.
198. Id. at 804.
199. Id.
200. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 177-81, 222 S.W.2d 995, 997-99
(1949); Texas Co. v. Wheat, 140 Tex. 468, 474-75, 168 S.W.2d 632, 635-36 (1943); Beckman v.
Exxon Corp., 539 S.W.2d 217, 218-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ);
Space City Oil Co. v. McGilvany, 519 S.W.2d 257, 258-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975,
no writ).
201. 715 S.W.2d at 804-06.
202. 712 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
203. Pagan Corporation forfeited its right to do business and its charter and corporate
privileges for failure to file a report or pay a tax or penalty under TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.255(a) (Vernon 1982), which provides: "If the corporate privileges of a corporation are
forfeited ... each director or officer of the corporation is liable for each debt of the corporation
that is created or incurred in this state after the date on which the report, tax, or penalty is due
204. 145 Tex. 379, 198 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. 1946). In Schwab the court stated that the liability
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porate officers since the liability on the lease was created or incurred prior to
the date of the corporation's forfeiture of its right to do business. 205
F. Effect of Modifications of Primary Lease on Sublease
In S & D Group, Inc. v. Talamas20 6 the owner leased a building to
Talamas, who entered into a sublease with S & D for a portion of the build-
ing. The sublease specifically incorporated the underlying lease by reference
and provided that the sublease term was to commence "September 1, 1982,
or upon the effective date of the [underlying lease], whichever is later. 20 7
At the time the sublease was executed the underlying lease provided that its
term was to commence September 1, 1982, except that if the building was
not completed by such date, the landlord had until November 1 to complete
the building. Due to construction delays, the underlying lease did not com-
mence until December 16, 1982. The owner and Talamas orally modified
the commencement date provisions of the underlying lease, but S & D and
Talamas made no such oral agreement or modification of the sublease.
The court held that the oral modification of the commencement date of
the underlying lease did not affect the written agreement between Talamas
and S & D, because S & D did not agree to the oral modification. 208 When
the sublease did not commence on September 1, 1982 or on November 1,
1982, the sublease agreement never took effect.2°9 The court implied that if
the sublease had contained a provision that the parties would be bound by
subsequent modifications of the underlying lease, the sublandlord likely
would have been able to enforce the sublease.210
G. Tenant Eviction
In Newhouse v. Settegast Heights Village Apartments211 the court consid-
ered a case of first impression and held that under HUD regulations a land-
lord cannot evict a tenant without stating good cause.2 12 In Newhouse the
landlord, who participated in the federal housing subsidy program, brought
a forcible detainer suit against the tenant to obtain possession of the premises
because her lease had expired. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment for the landlord, nothing that because the landlord was a recipient
of federal subsidies, he had consented to be regulated by the HUD eviction
imposed under the statute is only for debts contracted after the forfeiture of the right to do
business. Id. at 382, 198 S.W.2d at 81.
205. Pagan, 712 S.W.2d at 193.
206. 710 S.W.2d 680 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
207. Id. at 681.
208. Id. at 683-84.
209. Id.
210. Id. "Absent a provision in the Sublease that provided that the parties would be bound
by subsequent modifications in the Main Lease, or waiver, or some other equitable principle,
changes in the Main Lease made after its incorporation into the Sublease cannot affect the
rights of the Sublessee." Id. at 683.
211. 717 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
212. Id. at 132-33.
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procedures as well as state law. 213 The court reviewed the regulations 2 14
and the lease agreement between the parties215 and concluded that, under
the HUD regulations as well as the lease, a landlord must show good cause
before evicting a tenant and that refusal to renew a lease solely because the
term had expired did not constitute good cause.216
H. Lis Pendens by Tenant
In Helmsley-Spear of Texas, Inc. v. Blanton 217 defendants in the underly-
ing suit for breach of lease and constructive eviction owned and managed a
shopping center located in Houston. The plaintiffs in the underlying suit,
tenants in the shopping center, filed a notice of lis pendens against the shop-
ping center property following the defendants' execution of a contract to sell
the property. The defendants then brought a mandamus proceeding, assert-
ing the lis pendens was a cloud on their title to the property that might
interfere with the proposed sale.
Under section 12.007 of the Texas Property Code218 a claimant may file a
lis pendens during the pendency of an action involving (1) title to real prop-
erty, (2) the establishment of an interest in real property, or (3) an enforce-
ment of an encumbrance against real property. The tenants alleged that
their cause of action attempted to establish an interest in the shopping center
property. The court held, however, that the lis pendens was void because
the tenant's claim in the underlying suit did not affect the shopping center
property directly; rather, the tenant's claim only collaterally affected the
property. 219 Thus, the resulting lis pendens did not fall within the realm of
section 12.007.220 In the usual leasing situation, therefore, absent some lease
provision such as a purchase option, the tenant does not have an interest in
the leased property that would support the filing of a lis pendens.
213. Id. at 134.
214. 24 C.F.R. § 247.3 (1985) provides: "(a) General. The landlord may not terminate
any tenancy in a subsidized project except upon the following grounds: ... (3) Other good
cause." (Emphasis added.) The court also cited the November 1981 HUD handbook section
dealing with termination of tenancies, which states that the owner may not refuse to renew a
lease based solely on the fact that an initial or subsequent renewal term has expired. 717
S.W.2d at 133-34.
215. Paragraph 23 of the lease provided:
Any termination of this Agreement by the Landlord must be carried out in ac-
cordance with HUD regulations, State and local law, and the terms of this
Agreement. The Landlord may terminate this Agreement only for:
1. the Tenant's material noncompliance with the terms of this Agreement;
2. the Tenant's material failure to carry out obligations under any State
Landlord and Tenant Act; or
3. other good cause, which includes but is not limited to the Tenant's refusal
to accept the Landlord's proposed change to this Agreement. Terminations
for "other good cause" may only be effective as of the end of any initial or
successive term.
717 S.W.2d at 133.
216. Id. at 133-34.
217. 699 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
218. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007 (Vernon 1984).




In Crabtree v. Southmark Commercial Management221 the court held that
a summary judgment in favor of a landlord against his tenant based on an
anticipatory breach of a lease precluded any further action against the tenant
for rent or for failure to pay common area maintenance charges. 222 In Crab-
tree the tenant abandoned office space in violation of a ten-year lease and
failed to make any further payments. The landlord obtained a summary
judgment for rent and attorney's fees. After the first suit the landlord
brought a second suit and obtained a second summary judgment for addi-
tional rent and attorney's fees. The court held that res judicata barred the
second judgment. 223
The court stated that four options are available to a landlord when a ten-
ant breaches a lease by abandoning the property and terminating rental pay-
ments: (1) The landlord may decline to repossess the property, electing
instead to maintain the -lease in full force and effect. The landlord can then
sue on a contract theory for rent as it comes due. (2) The landlord may treat
the tenant's conduct as an anticipatory breach of contract. He may then
repossess and retain the property for his own purposes. The landlord can
then recover the present value of the rentals due under the lease contract,
reduced by the reasonable cash market value of the lease for the unexpired
term. (3) The landlord may treat the tenant's conduct as an anticipatory
breach of contract, repossess, and re-lease the property. Under this option
the landlord can then recover the contractual rental reduced by the amount
that the new tenant will pay. (4) The landlord may declare the lease for-
feited, relieving the tenant of liability for future rental payments.224 In
Crabtree the court concluded that the landlord had treated the tenant's con-
duct as an anticipatory breach in the original action.225 The landlord's re-
covery was, therefore, limited to "the present value of the rentals that accrue
under the lease contract reduced by the reasonable cash market value of the
lease for the unexpired term."' 226 Res judicata precluded the second sum-
mary judgment since it constituted the same cause of action.
221. 704 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
222. Id. at 480-81.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 480.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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